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Source changed 2026-11-18 18:43:39 UTC · snapshot created 2026-11-18 18:45:23 UTC · last check 2026-11-18 20:10:10 UTC

FIN.23:5 - Archetypal Grounding

Consider two wholly owned subsidiaries, A and B. A has cash 90, must pay 40 for operations now and retain 20, leaving 30 potentially available. B has cash 10, must pay 70 for an investment now and retain 10, so it needs 70 of finance. B’s supported day-90 operating receipt is 100. There are no other cash flows, taxes or fees in this case. Assume the applicable rules permit the internal loan and the necessary consents have been obtained. Its worthwhile amount and price depend on the two subsidiaries’ alternatives.

The available external comparison is a B loan of 70 requiring 77 on day 90, while A can place its 30 externally and obtain 30.60 on that date. The proposal is to lend A’s 30 to B and borrow only 40 externally on terms requiring 44. Let internal interest be i. A requires at least the 0.60 available from its placement on the stipulated comparable risk and liquidity grounds. B’s total service is 30 + i + 44 = 74 + i, against 77 externally, so its upper bound is i = 3. The range 0.60 through 3 permits a financial division of the gain. Selecting i = 1.50 gives A more than its comparison and leaves B better off. If risk or liquidity is not comparable, re-estimate that bound before choosing the price; the interval supplies no tax-pricing conclusion.

At initial funding, A pays operations 40 and lends 30, retaining 20. B receives 30 internally and 40 externally, pays 70 and retains 10. On day 90, B has 110, repays 31.50 internally and 44 externally, and retains 34.50; A has 51.50. Under the separate external arrangements, B retains 33 and A 50.60. The combined gain is 2.40: external interest avoided is 3, less the 0.60 placement return forgone. Internal interest 1.50 divides the result without becoming another external cost.

This construction obtains proposed transactions and a mutually acceptable financial range from the two entities’ needs and alternatives. It still requires the actual loan terms, lender availability and execution. If the external 40 can be drawn only after A’s money arrives, place that transfer and the bank’s conditions before B commits to the investment. A promised day-end total cannot support an earlier irrevocable payment.

Change one premise: A must be able to make an additional payment of 25 on day 30 while preserving reserve 20. Its internal lending capacity without another source is now 90 − 40 − 25 − 20 = 5. Making the 30 loan callable does not repair the combination: B has already invested and cannot return 25 then. Compare lending at most 5 with more external funding at B, obtaining a committed backup of 25 for A with its later service, or changing the investment timing. Reprice and recalculate the selected alternative. The group still has the same opening cash and ownership, but the appropriate financial connections have changed.

FIN.23:5.1 - Change the location of a claim, not merely a reported ratio

In a separate simplified recovery case, parent P owns all of subsidiary S. S has assets realizing 80 and existing external claims of 60; P has no other asset and owes 30 externally. The stipulated ranking pays S’s creditors before distributing the residual to P, with no taxes or process costs. S’s creditors receive 60, P receives 20, and P’s creditor recovers only 20 of its 30. Group assets of 80 and debt of 90 do not tell that creditor’s answer.

For comparison, suppose the new 30 had instead been borrowed directly by S and ranked equally with the existing 60 against that same 80. The stipulated pro-rata recovery would be 30/90 × 80 = 26.67 for the new lender and 53.33 for the existing creditors. Location and rank have changed the distribution. The existing creditors’ worse recovery is a reason to inspect their restrictions and required consent, not an available free benefit to P. A guarantee or security package would require its own claim and recovery construction.

FIN.23:5.2 - Distinguish seasonal pooling from permanent capital

Several trading entities have offsetting collection and purchasing cycles. A pool with specified transfer and draw terms can use temporary surpluses against temporary needs, retaining the member limits, external backup and local reserves. Compare its external financing and operating cost with separate arrangements through the dates on which members need their money back.

Now one member begins a development programme that remains in deficit beyond every other member’s surplus period. Repeated overnight entries do not create a repayment source. Isolate that enduring amount from the seasonal pool and compare a term loan backed by an appropriate capital provider, equity, staged development or a smaller programme. The seasonal service can continue for the remaining fluctuation. This change in the financial mechanism selects a different construction while preserving the useful part of the pool.