Library / Economic Reasoning and Coordination Principles Framework
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ECO.8:2 - Problem

A group may assume that strangers share its purpose, local knowledge or willingness to help. It can then promise a result whose external suppliers have no reason or ability to provide. Separately pricing internal contributions can suppress discretionary help or shared learning when the work depends on them. Explicit terms can instead improve cooperation when they clarify a burden or obligation the group currently leaves unresolved.

A single scale from “small” to “large” hides the difference. Personal relations, an organization’s assignments and impersonal exchange can all matter to the same action at the same time.