FIN.22:5 - Archetypal Grounding
A constructed debtor CFO asks whether to propose an extension giving a lender a better financial recovery. That lender is owed 100; no other claimant shares the net recoveries in this illustration. Exit yields 65 now. Restructuring yields an expected 80 after one year. Both figures are net of the applicable operating, tax, restructuring or exit costs and interim-finance repayment. All amounts share a currency and valuation date; a matching lender valuation rate of 10% is supplied.
| Route | Expected net lender payment | Present value |
|---|---|---|
| Exit | 65 now | 65.00 |
| Extension | 80 in one year | 72.73 |
| Slower extension variant | 80 in three years | 60.11 |
The one-year extension supports a conditional proposal on these financial grounds. Moving the same 80 to year three reverses that preference. Neither comparison establishes actual lender consent or interim funding. If continuation needs money that no available arrangement supplies, exclude that route from the actionable set or state the specific funding condition.
With several creditors, repeat the payment treatment for their actual claims and priorities. Do not distribute these single-lender amounts pro rata by assumption; a different security interest or consent rule can change both recoveries and feasible routes.
A larger total recovery can still leave a creditor worse off
Consider a separate constructed debtor with two old claims against one pool: a senior claim of 60, a junior claim of 40 and residual equity. The applicable exit treatment is stipulated: net sale proceeds of 70 are available now after every cost and other claim. Senior receives 60, junior 10 and equity zero. This priority is part of the case, not a jurisdictional rule.
A proposed turnaround followed by sale needs 10 immediately for the necessary transition work. A new lender actually offers 10 net, repayable as 11 in one year ahead of both old claims under a priority that all required parties would have to accept. The dated operating plan is otherwise funded throughout the year. At year end, realizable proceeds after ordinary operating payments and tax but before final process costs and the interim claim are 120 or 80, each with supported probability one half. Final process cost is 8 in either state. These proceeds include the benefits of the initial transition spending; that spending is funded by the 10 advance and is not deducted a second time at sale.
After process cost and interim repayment, the pool for old claims is 101 in the high state and 61 in the low state. Applying the original priority gives:
| Outcome | Net pool for old claims | Senior payment | Junior payment | Equity payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| High | 101 | 60 | 40 | 1 |
| Low | 61 | 60 | 1 | 0 |
| Probability-weighted payment | 81 | 60 | 20.50 | 0.50 |
For this illustration only, all expected recovery streams have a qualified 5% one-year valuation rate, including a stipulated zero premium for their remaining risk. Their total present value is 81/1.05 = 77.14, exceeding the immediate exit’s 70. But the senior creditor’s present value is 60/1.05 = 57.14, below its exit recovery 60. Junior receives value 19.52 and equity 0.48. The higher total does not establish senior consent.
Allocating the average pool 81 as if certain would give senior 60, junior 21 and equity zero. That loses the actual high-state residual and overstates junior expected payment by 0.50. The order of calculation therefore changes a participant’s result.
One proposed amendment increases the senior allowed year-end claim to 65 while keeping its priority. It receives 65 in the high state and all 61 in the low state, with expected payment 63 and present value 60. Junior receives 36 or zero, with expected payment 18 and value 17.14; equity receives zero. The senior now matches its financial exit value on these grounds, and junior remains above 10. This describes a possible allocation for negotiation, not a right to compel agreement. Different claim-specific risk prices or participation interests can change that judgement.
If the only obtainable interim offer instead requires repayment 20 for the same advance of 10, the pool for old claims falls to 92 or 52. Its expected present value becomes 72/1.05 = 68.57, below the exit’s 70. The operating improvement has not changed, but its financing price reverses the aggregate financial preference. If no one supplies the initial 10 at all, the continuation route fails earlier, regardless of its modeled year-end value.
Recover value from a continuing business and new instruments
In a separate constructed proposal, the old creditor’s allowed claim is 100. The feasible liquidation alternative pays it 60 now, net of all relevant costs and other claims. A continuation plan requires 20 immediately for implementation. A new lender actually offers 20 net on specified terms, with a claim paying 22 in one year and valued at 20 on the common comparison date. The proposed treatment ranks this claim ahead of the replacement note described below. The dated plan covers the other operating and financing needs; acceptance of the proposed claim treatment remains required.
FIN.7 supplies a supportable operating value of 120 for the subsequent cash flows of the implemented plan, before payments to financing claims. The upfront 20 is paid from the advance and is outside those subsequent flows; no surplus advance remains as cash to add to the value. The new-money debt is deducted once when deriving the interests available under the plan. There are no other prior claims, excess assets or omitted implementation costs.
The proposal extinguishes the old claim of 100 in exchange for a new note promising 40 in two years and 50% of the ordinary equity. On compatible FIN.5/7 valuation grounds, the note is worth 32, reflecting its actual timing, priority and risk. The note’s face amount is not its present value. All ordinary shares have identical proportionate economic rights, and there is no separate control adjustment in this case.
Deduct the actual debt values to obtain common equity: 120 − 20 − 32 = 68. The old creditor receives the note worth 32 plus half the equity, worth 34, for a recovery value of 66. The other half is worth 34 to the remaining owners. The new lender’s 20, the creditor’s 66 and those owners’ 34 sum to 120. The old face claim of 100 has been replaced; it is not another deduction alongside the new instruments.
Compared with liquidation at 60, the creditor gains value 6 on the stated grounds. The 66 is a valuation of its promised note and ownership, not cash available to meet an immediate payment. Trading or financing against those interests would need its own attainable terms. Neither the continuing business value of 120 nor the exchanged face amount of 100 is the creditor’s receipt.
With the same supported debt values, the creditor’s recovery is 32 + 0.50 × (V − 20 − 32), where V is the continuing operating value. It matches 60 at V = 108. This identifies the conditional valuation threshold; if a revised operating outlook also changes debt risk or terms, revalue those claims before using it. A favorable value comparison supports a proposal; obtaining the required agreements and completing the funded plan remain separate actions.