G.4:5 - Archetypal Grounding
Tell. A team working within a CG‑Frame must choose and justify a set of candidate methods (possibly a selected set or a set retained in an archive) under explicit legality, evidence, and scope constraints. CHR provides the typed measurement basis; CAL declares auditable predicates and flows that separately grounded runtime work may apply.
Show 1 (bounded CAL pack skeleton).
Use: R&D selected-set choice. The pack names the exact CG frame and EntityOfConcern, candidate-set ClaimScope, ReferencePlane, and evaluation window. CHR defines SafetyClass(ord↑), CostUSD_2026(ratio↓), Readiness(nominal).
CAL.Operator: DominatesParetoSignature over CHR types, precondition references CHR guard macros.CAL.AcceptanceClause: AC_SafetyGateReusable typed predicate forSafetyClass(and its levels), citingSafetyResultArgument-D1, the A.6.1 argument declaration that admits a C.16 measurement-result episteme for that Characteristic. Thresholds are valid for the statedClaimScopeand evaluation window; unknown handling uses tri-state pins. The clause names no current measurement-result episteme.CAL.Flow: Flow_ParetoPortfolioDeclares a selected-set result kind; gated byAC_SafetyGateandAC_Budget.CAL.EvidenceProfile: EP_SafetyEvidenceDeclares anchor ids and freshness policy pins required forSCR.
When this CAL pack supplies selector gates, it publishes TaskMapRef=<SafetySelectionMap, E3>. That map cites CALCharterRef=<SafetyCALCharter, E2>, C.22 TaskSignatureRef=SafetyPortfolioTaskSignature-E4, the exact task, and edition-bearing refs AC_SafetyGate-E2, Flow_ParetoPortfolio-E1, DominatesPareto-E3, and EP_SafetyEvidence-E4; it contains no threshold values. Downstream G.5 consumes the exact TaskSignatureRef and this TaskMapRef together, verifies that the map cites the same signature, and resolves the charter and declarations through their refs. If the charter or a cited clause changes, G.4 publishes another TaskMap edition; selectors that still cite <SafetySelectionMap, E3> continue to replay the old boundary.
Show 2 (explicit cross-sense or ReferencePlane import).
A SafetyClass result uses an expression with a different F.17 source-local meaning or comes from another ReferencePlane. CAL may author a clause using it only after the exact F.17 cells and obtaining F.9 relation are cited when meanings differ, and the applicable plane or edition crossing records are cited when those values differ. The clause keeps its declared ClaimScope and window; the import does not silently widen either.
Show 3 (one performed acceptance evaluation).
Before the candidate action is admitted as Work, A.13 recovers SafetyEvaluatorSystem-17 : U.System for exact action SafetyAcceptanceEvaluationAction-17. Its admitted SafetyEvaluatorBoundary-17 contains the evaluation controller, its active decision state, and the input/output channels through which it applies the clause; it excludes the CAL declarations, measurement-result episteme, candidate, assignment, and containing team System. The action’s scope is SafetyAcceptanceClaimScope-17, its working situation is SafetyGateEvaluationSituation-17, and its window is 2026-07-30T09:00:00Z through 2026-07-30T09:20:00Z. It is directed by SafetyAcceptanceDecisionNorm-17: apply the current clause to admissible current inputs, return unknown rather than force a threshold verdict when uncertainty crosses the boundary, and reject an input whose declared result shape is incompatible. The relevant conditions are clause edition, result-shape admissibility, measurement currentness, and uncertainty relative to the threshold.
The local kind SafetyAcceptanceEvaluatorSystemRole is declared under A.2. Its membership criterion requires the stable work-facing contribution of safety-acceptance evaluation and goal-directed, condition-sensitive regulation under SafetyAcceptanceDecisionNorm-17: the holder must bind admissible inputs, choose the clause-defined verdict, and abstain or return unknown when the declared conditions require it. SafetyEvaluatorDecisionTrace-17 shows SafetyEvaluatorSystem-17 rejecting an incompatible result shape and returning unknown when the admissible uncertainty interval crosses the threshold; the system-boundary and runtime records show that those actions occurred within SafetyEvaluatorBoundary-17. The cited decision-trace, system-boundary and runtime records support the criterion facts under A.2’s membership rule; A.10 makes that source-to-use account recoverable. The case independently classifies SafetyEvaluatorSystem-17 under SafetyAcceptanceEvaluatorSystemRole. Neither the candidate Work nor the assignment supplies that classification. No Grade, autonomy result, characteristic profile, or stronger assurance claim is consumed here.
The same A.13 core uses SafetyAcceptanceEvaluationAssignment, a directly declared U.SystemRoleAssignment species under A.2.1. The species defines holder, assigned-kind, and evaluation-candidate participant meanings; its predicate appoints the holder to evaluate that candidate under the applicable clause for the stated scope, situation, and window. SafetyAcceptanceEvaluationAssignment-17 obtains with SafetyEvaluatorSystem-17 as holder, SafetyAcceptanceEvaluatorSystemRole as assigned-kind value, and C-17 as evaluation candidate. Its maximal uninterrupted predicate-true interval covers the full stated window.
Only after that A.13 core is established does A.15.1 independently admit EvalWork-2026-07-30-17 : U.Work from its exact performance history, enacted SafetyAcceptanceMethod, temporal extent, and obtaining containing-System relation to independently admitted SafetyEvaluationTeamSystem-17. The actual A.6.1 application SafetyAcceptanceApplication-17 binds candidate C-17 separately from its binding of current C.16 measurement-result episteme SafetyMeasureResult-E17 to SafetyResultArgument-D1 while using unchanged reusable clause AC_SafetyGate. Neither the assignment nor an F.6 conclusion is an A.15.1 admission premise.
Because this worked case explicitly says that the Work was performed under an assignment, F.6 afterward establishes performedUnderAssignment(EvalWork-2026-07-30-17, SafetyAcceptanceEvaluationAssignment-17) through the same obtaining A.13 assignment. The direct case fact links that exact pair, holder equality holds, and the assignment interval covers the Work. A different overlapping assignment held by the same performer would not establish this attribution.
SafetyMeasureResult-E17 states the measured safety characteristic, scale, attributed value, uncertainty, model, calibration, and measurement Work; it is neither the raw detector output nor the acceptance verdict. The clause application obtains unknown because the uncertainty interval crosses the threshold. A later SafetyMeasureResult-E18 can bind through separately identified SafetyAcceptanceApplication-18 while AC_SafetyGate remains unchanged. A C.16 result for CostUSD_2026, a result with an incompatible declared shape, or raw detector output fails SafetyResultArgument-D1 before the predicate runs; it does not cause a new reusable clause edition. A separate C.2.1 episteme asserts that exact verdict and cites its provenance under A.10 and, when the EvidenceGraph extension is present, G.6; G.11 supplies currentness. A later C.11 result may record defer, and its claim uses the verdict episteme through an exact premise or decision-use relation. Any decision-making Work remains separate. The clause card, proof-ledger row, evidence edge, and decision record do not retroactively establish the measurement Work or the evaluation occurrence.
Show 4 (a support model and its separate acceptance threshold).
For the pump-triage use in G.5 §0.5, consider a separately declared gated variant. AC_InputConditionGate-E1 accepts a declared probability of at least 0.85 that both the measurement series is valid (event A) and its time alignment is valid (event B) for the same 24-hour input. Its scope, evaluation window, result-input declaration, and unknown behavior belong to this G.4 clause, not to the default composition rule. PumpInputEvidence-E1 supplies the receiving model and provenance for those event meanings and probabilities. An applicable TaskMapRef binds that clause, profile, and the matching C.22 task signature.
Suppose the application inputs establish P(A)=0.9 and P(B)=0.9 and the profile’s model establishes independence. The model gives P(A ∩ B)=0.81, so the clause returns fail. Minimum 0.9 would incorrectly pass. If independence or a justified conditional alternative is unavailable, the missing joint probability yields the clause’s unknown result, with the declared downstream degrade/abstain behavior; a high F or formal line tag cannot replace it.
For a different receiving question that asks only for a qualified comparison on existing heterogeneous support, the profile retains the proof, empirical contributions, shared-bias limitations, and contrary evidence under B.1.3/C.2.2. It does not invent a probability or apply AC_InputConditionGate-E1 to that different question. The ordinary G.5 shortlist remains available without an additional assurance calculation.