C.11:4.2.6 - Resource-aware choice is one lens over declared source families

• Start from one declared source family or one declared source-family composition such as Front, Archive, or Front+Archive.
• Apply one declared decision lens over that source family rather than inventing one hidden universal winner rule.
• CostToProbe, ValueOfInformation, and ValueOfComputation belong to that lens-side choice doctrine.
• They may justify another probe, one changed local comparison outcome, or one stop decision, but they do not rename the current DominanceSet and do not declare one shortlist-family result.
• If one candidate remains worth probing because its expected information value still exceeds its expected cost, say that explicitly as one lens-side choice judgement.
• If one archive point remains worth probing because it may change the frontier later, keep that as one resource-aware choice claim, not as evidence that the point is already on the current front.
• The kernel floor here is:
  • A.19.SelectorMechanism remains the cited set-return floor
  • SelectionSlot remains the selector output floor
  • if later selector-facing set-result declaration is required, that set-returning floor may support one Shortlist or one RankedShortlist in G.5 rather than one forced single winner

C.11:4.3.1 - Classical evidential baseline

Stay with the classical evidential baseline when the question is to compare already-available options through preferences, utilities or desirabilities, beliefs, and likely outcomes under uncertainty.

In this baseline, the options are being compared as evidence about what consequences are likely if they are chosen. This is the ordinary default when intervention structure, predictor-coupling, or context-sensitive non-commutativity are not yet doing real work in the case.

Typical practical cash-outs are:

• choose now because the current shared BeliefState and OutcomeModel already make one option or tie-set survive, and no still-feasible probe is worth its cost;
• probe again because one further observation, measurement, or comparison pass could still change the ranking without requiring a heavier causal, subjunctive, or context-order repair;
• reroute because the current decision question is no longer really comparing one fixed OptionSet, but has become search, pool policy, selector-result declaration, publication-availability, or enactment work.

The baseline is still unfinished when the current comparison invokes it but cannot keep one shared BeliefState and OutcomeModel across the compared options, or when one heavier defect is already live and the current comparison still pretends one plain evidential comparison is enough.

C.11:4.3.2 - Causal repair

Switch on one InterventionModel when taking one option changes the world through intervention rather than merely signaling which outcome was already likely.

What changes here is not the prestige label of the theory line, but the comparative question itself: the working question is no longer only what this option indicates about the outcome, but what this option causes in the outcome structure.

Typical practical cash-outs are:

• choose now because, under the declared intervention structure, one option now causally dominates or remains the survivor and no remaining feasible probe can reverse that causal ranking;
• probe again because one intervention-relevant uncertainty still blocks a lawful causal comparison and one named next probe could still change which option causally survives;
• reroute because the intervention-use question has already moved from local choice into enactment planning, protocol design, or one neighboring question.

The causal repair is incomplete if the comparison still treats options only as evidence after invoking causal language, or if an InterventionModel is named without stating what defect of the lighter evidential comparison it repairs.

C.11:4.3.3 - Success-first or subjunctive repair

Switch on one CounterfactualModel plus one SubjunctiveDependenceRelation when Newcomb-like, blackmail-like, or other predictor-coupled cases remain under-described by the older evidential-versus-causal split.

What changes here is that the comparison must stay answerable to linked decision procedures, predictors, or structurally similar choosers rather than only to direct intervention on one local event.

Typical practical cash-outs are:

• choose now because, under the declared counterfactual or subjunctive structure, one option survives once the predictor-coupled comparison is made explicit;
• probe again because one further model clarification, predictor assumption check, or decision-procedure comparison could still reverse the current survivor relation;
• reroute because the governing decision question is no longer settling local choice doctrine but has become one wider characterization, negotiation, or enactment question that only borrowed predictor-coupling language.

If that coupled structure is not live, do not activate this branch. If a predictor-coupled or success-first repair is named but the linked structure that changes the comparison is still unspecified, the branch is not yet load-bearing in the current decision.

C.11:4.3.4 - Active-inference neighboring repair

Bring the active-inference line into view when the chooser is embodied, online, and socially coupled, and when the decision cannot be understood as one disembodied choose-then-act moment.

What changes here is practical choice logic, not one neighboring-school label. The comparison is no longer over one frozen snapshot alone. The comparison must now ask whether one more observation, one more coupled update, or one more socially mediated or role-expectation clarification actually changes what should be done now.

This minimal choice doctrine makes that social-expectation pressure explicit, but it does not yet operationalize one full ROE or SocialExpectationRegime object model inside C.11. If that heavier machinery is itself what the case hinges on, the decision record should say so honestly rather than pretending the local C.11 floor has already settled it.

Typical practical cash-outs are:

• probe again because one further embodied observation, coupled update, or explicit role-expectation clarification can still change the state estimate enough to reverse the current survivor relation;
• choose now because delay itself now worsens the state being managed, closes the window in which the preferred option remains feasible, or leaves no lawful time for one more socially mediated check;
• reroute because the question has already become enactment sequencing or agent-characterization work rather than local choice.

C.11 keeps the choice question visible there, but A.13 still governs the narrower question of what kind of agent or agential system is in play. For measured characteristic and evidence claims, use A.17 for Characteristic identity and arity, A.18 for Scale and Coordinate bindings, A.19 for the declared space and reusable predicate, C.16 for the measurement account, and A.10 for bounded reliance on the evidence. C.24 still governs sequencing and enactment once a choice result has already been fixed.

Do not invoke this line only because one agent is acting in the world. Invoke it when embodied coupling, online updating, or explicit social-expectation pressure actually changes what the chooser should do now from the current OptionSet.

C.11:4.3.5 - Quantum-like neighboring repair

Bring the quantum-like line into view when context effects, order effects, response-replicability tension, or incompatible-question structure change the comparative state enough that one simple commutative probability reading no longer fits.

What changes here is the practical structure of comparison. One order of questioning or one framing path may produce one different survivor relation from another. The comparison must therefore either stabilize the comparison under one declared order or show why one more clarifying pass is still needed.

This minimal choice doctrine keeps the branch at that measurement-sensitive recognition point. It does not yet claim one full quantum-like state-space package inside C.11; it claims only that the live comparison may need one explicit measurement-class or order-sensitive repair rather than one plain commutative reading.

Typical practical cash-outs are:

• choose now under one declared order or framing because rival orders no longer change which option survives;
• probe again because one framing-sensitive comparison pass, one further question order, one response-replicability check, or one explicit measurement-class clarification could still reverse the survivor relation;
• reroute when the current decision question is no longer deciding among live options but has become one selector-result declaration, publication-availability, or enactment problem that only borrowed order-effect language rhetorically.

Do not promote this line to the unmarked default unless those repaired limitations are live in the case.

Do not invoke this line merely because a case feels psychologically subtle. Invoke it when one changed order, framing, response pattern, or incompatible-question structure actually changes the comparison state or the survivor relation in the live choice.

If no causal, subjunctive, active-inference, or quantum-like refinement is needed for a live limitation, stay with the classical evidential baseline.

The family map is therefore one disciplined set of refinements over the same choice question, not one excuse to rename every neighboring question as decision theory.